Real customer environment
From a standard sales user to the cloud behind it.
A gray-box assessment of a real customer Salesforce environment that began with one low-privilege account and ended with access to the organization’s connected cloud infrastructure.
The path
Four steps, one boundary crossed.
- 01
Initial access
A low-privilege standard Salesforce user account.
- 02
Map the environment
Native Salesforce APIs, SOQL queries, custom objects, permissions and business logic mapped systematically.
- 03
Find the credentials
Misconfigured Field-Level Security exposed plaintext cloud integration credentials in a custom object.
- 04
Pivot to cloud
The recovered keys authenticated to the organization’s connected cloud infrastructure and storage.
The finding
Cloud integration credentials exposed via SOQL.
AigentX identified custom settings objects connecting Salesforce to external cloud storage. After authenticating as a low-privilege standard user, it mapped the Salesforce API and found Field-Level Security misconfigured for those objects. A targeted SOQL query returned plaintext configuration containing valid long-term cloud access and secret keys.
This created a direct path out of Salesforce: the recovered credentials authenticated to the organization’s broader cloud infrastructure and storage buckets.
- Starting point
- Low-privileged standard Salesforce user
- Technique
- Native API and SOQL enumeration of custom objects
- Root cause
- Misconfigured Field-Level Security on a custom settings object
- Impact
- Authentication to connected cloud infrastructure and storage
Also found
What else the assessment surfaced.
Cross-user file access
Insufficient object-level access control on native content APIs let an authenticated standard user enumerate and retrieve files owned by other users, including administrators.
Unrestricted data extraction
Schema enumeration plus inconsistent sharing rules allowed automated extraction of hundreds of thousands of records through native pagination.
Business-logic manipulation
Excessive API write permissions over fields feeding automated calculations allowed values to be changed directly via REST PATCH.
File content inspection bypass
Webshells, XSS handlers, executables and path-traversal payloads uploaded without effective content inspection, then served from trusted download URLs.
Why it matters
Relationships, not isolated flaws.
These were not isolated flaws in a conventional web application. They existed in the relationships between native APIs, custom objects, permission boundaries, business logic, file-sharing controls and connected cloud services, and AigentX mapped those relationships as part of the assessment.